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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STEVEN D. WALTON and URSULA 
WALTON, his wife; DOUGLAS P. 
HOLBROOK and SUZANNE M. 
HOLBROOK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ROAD COMMISSION, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SUMMIT COUNTY and SUMMIT 
PARK, INC., 
Third-Partv Defendants. 
Case No. 14532 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought in equity by the Plaintiffs-
Appellants to compel the State of Utah to either restore certain 
property rights taken by the State without the payment of just 
compensation or to condemn their property. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court granted a Motion for Summary Judgment which 
had been filed by the State of Utah on the basis that the req-
uirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code 
Annotated 63-30-1 et. seq. (1953) had not been complied with. 
Specifically, the State contended and the Trial Court accepted 
the argument that the Plaintiffs1 failure to file written notice 
of their claim with the Utah Attorney General within one year 
after their cause of action arose barred them for pursuing the 
matter. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek a reversal of the Summary Judgment 
entered by the Trial Court and a chance to proceed with their 
case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants are the owners of two lots in 
the Summit Park Subdivision, which is located east of Salt Lake 
City in Summit County. 
In 1970 and 1972 (R.114), the State of Utah acquired 
(by purchase and condemnation) various lots in the Summit Park 
Plat "E" Subdivision in the general vicinity of the lots owned 
by the Plaintiffs. The lots were acquired in connection with 
certain planned changes and improvements involving Summit Drive, 
a roadway located in the Summit Park Subdivision (see Exhibit A 
which is attached to Plaintiffs1 original Complaint - R.3). The 
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lots owned by the Plaintiffs were not acquired since the State 
apparently believed that the planned work on the roadway would 
not result in a taking of any of the property owned by them. 
(R.44). 
In September of 1972 (R.94) the State completed work on 
the roadway. The result of the work was the elimination of 
practical access from the roadway to the cul-de-sac on which 
the Plaintiffs1 lots were located and a consequent taking of 
the access to Plaintiffs1 property. (R.74). 
In August of 1971 (R.109), the State entered into a 
lease with Third-Party Defendant Summit County covering part 
of the property acquired by the State in connection with the 
planned improvements to the roadway. The property covered by 
the lease is located very close to the property owned by the 
Plaintiffs. Summit County proceeded to locate an equipment 
shed on the property which, according to the allegations of 
Plaintiffs1 Complaint, violated recorded Summit Park Subdivision 
Restrictive Covenants (see Exhibit B attached to Plaintiffs1 
original Complaint - R.5) and resulted in a taking of Plaintiffs1 
property rights of view and light. 
Plaintiffs Steven D. Walton and Ursula Walton are res-
idents of the State of Illinois (Walton deposition - p.3). They 
had purchased their lot with the thought in mind of someday 
moving back to Utah and building a home on it. The first time 
that they became aware of what had happened to the property was 
in January of 1974 when they traveled to Utah for the funeral 
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of Mr. Walton's mother (Walton deposition - p.11). They con-
tacted a lawyer and this case was thereafter filed in August 
of 1974. 
Plaintiffs Douglas P. Holbrook and Suzanne M. Holbrook 
are residents of Salt Lake City, Utah. They too purchased 
their lot with the idea of eventually building a home on it. 
(Holbrook deposition - p.4). Mr. Holbrook testified that he 
first became aware of what the State had done to the property in 
late 1972 or early 1973 (Holbrook deposition - pp.9,10). Mr. 
and Mrs. Holbrook became a part of this action when, with leave 
of the Court, an Amended Complaint was filed naming them as 
parties plaintiff in December of 1975. (R.74). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Under the circumstances of this case, are the Plaintiffs 
barred from prosecuting this equitable action by the one year 
limitation period contained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE THERE IS A TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
DOES NOT PROTECT THE STATE FROM SUIT AND THUS, 
IN A CASE SUCH AS THIS ONE, THERE IS NO OBL-
IGATION TO COMPLY WITH THE PROCEDURES SET FORTH 
IN THE STATUTES BY WHICH THE GOVERNMENT WAIVED 
ITS SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. 
In 1965 the State Legislature enacted the Utah Governmental 
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Immunity Act (Utah Code Annotated 63-30-1 et. seq. (1953)),thereby 
waiving its immunity from suit for certain designated governmental 
activities. In connection with this waiver of immunity,procedures 
and time periods were established for presenting and thereafter 
prosecuting claims which were authorized by the waiver. 
However, long before the passage of this legislation this 
Court held that the defense of sovereign immunity had no appli-
cation where the State had taken property, in the constitutional 
sense, without having agreed to compensate the property owner or 
instituted condemnation proceedings. State v. District Court, 
Fourth Judicial District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P.2d 502 (1938). The 
Court specifically approved the issuance of an injunction under 
circumstances where property is taken or damaged for public use 
without appropriate steps being taken in an eminent domain pro-
ceeding, and held that governmental immunity is not available 
as a defense where the aid of equity is sought with respect to 
an act forbidden by law. 
In the case of Hampton v. State Road Commission, 21 Utah 2d 
342, 445 P.2d 708 (1968), this Court again held that the defense 
of sovereign immunity was not available in an equitable action 
involving an alleged taking of a property right (in that case, 
as in the instant case, the right of access to property). 
Since equitable actions of the sort initiated by the 
Appellants had been approved by this Court well prior to the 
passage of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and since, in 
such equitable actions, it has always been the rule that the 
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concept of laches, rather than the otherwise applicable statute 
of limitations applies (Fisher v. Davis, 11 Utah 81, 291 Pac. 493 
(1930)), the question is whether the State Legislature intended 
to apply the limitation provisions contained in the Utah Govern-
mental Immunity Act to such equitable actions. It is interesting 
to note that the full title of the Act which was designated as 
S.B. 4 and was passed by the Legislature in 1965 was "An Act 
Relating to the Immunity of the State, Its Agencies and Political 
Subdivisions from Actions at Law; Providing for Exemption Thereto, 
for the Purchase of Liability Insurance, and for the Payment of 
Claims and Judgments" (emphasis added). Laws of Utah, 1965, 
Ch. 139, pg. 390. A review of the provisions of the Act supports 
the conclusion that it was intended to apply to actions at law 
for damages and that nothing contained therein was directed 
towards equitable actions with respect to which the State had 
already been held to be not immune. 
Thus, it seems clear that the limitation provision con-
tained in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which is relied 
upon by the State has absolutely no application to this equitable 
action and that the Trial Court erred in applying it. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT, SITTING AS A COURT OF EQUITY, SHOULD 
HAVE APPLIED THE CONCEPT OF LACHES, RATHER THAN THE 
STATUTORY LIMITATIONS PERIOD. UNDER THE STANDARD OF 
LACHES THE PLAINTIFFS1 ACTION WAS TIMELY COMMENCED 
AND IT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO PROCEED. 
"The doctrine of laches has existed since 
the beginning of equity jurisdiction and its 
existence and application are independent of 
statutes of limitation". 30A C.J.S. "Equity" §113. 
Whereas statutes of limitation are based upon a fixed time period, 
the equitable concept of "laches" is not. This Court has held 
that the basic standard to be applied where laches is asserted 
as a defense is whether the plaintiff neglected, for an unreason-
able length of time, and under circumstances suggesting a lack of 
diligence, to pursue his claim. Ruthrauff v. Silver King Western 
Mining and Milling Co., 95 Utah 279, 80 P.2d 338 (1938). 
Sometimes, however, courts of equity will consider the 
statute of limitations which would apply to a suit at law in 
considering the question of laches, though the statute is not 
binding and other factors such as diligence on the part of the 
plaintiff and prejudice to the defendant will usually be given 
principal consideration in deciding whether the action should be 
permitted to proceed. 30A C.J.S. "Equity" §131. Thus, it might 
be helpful to consider what the statute of limitations period was 
which applied at the time that this Court approved the bringing 
of actions in equity under the circumstances involved in this case. 
The statute of limitations which seems to have the closest 
relationship to a case such as this one is Utah Code Annotated 
78-12-26 (1953), which requires that actions for injury to real 
property be brought within three years after the cause of action 
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accrued* This statute should be considered in light of the rule 
that, 
"Courts of equity generally decline to apply 
the statute where the plaintiff neither knew 
nor had reasonable means for knowing of the 
existence of a cause of action . . •" 
51 Am* Jur. 2d "Limitation of Actions" §146. 
Taking into account the concept of laches, the statute 
of limitations which has the closest relationship to these facts 
and the equitable rule that lack of knowledge of facts giving 
rise to a cause of action on the part of the plaintiff will be 
considered in applying the statute, the Appellants believe that 
it will be obvious that the Trial Court erred in dismissing the 
action on the basis that it had not been timely filed. 
Plaintiffs' property rights were taken at the following 
times: 
1. Sometime subsequent to August of 1971 the large 
equipment shed was moved onto property owned by 
the State which is located very close to the 
Plaintiffs1 property. This action resulted in a 
taking of the right that the Plaintiffs had to have 
the applicable restrictive covenants complied with 
and a taking of their rights of light and view. 
2. In September of 1972 the State completed work on 
Summit Drive, cutting off the access to Plaintiffs1 
property. 
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Plaintiffs Steven D. Walton and Ursula Walton became aware of 
what had happened to their property in January of 1974, and 
Plaintiffs Douglas P. Holbrook and Suzanne M. Holbrook became 
aware of what had happened to their property in late 1972 or 
early 1973. This action was filed by the Waltons in August of 
1974 and the Holbrooks became parties in December of 1975. 
Based upon these facts, the Appellants submit that this 
action was timely filed. It was initiated within six months after 
the Waltons became aware that they had been injured and the 
Holbrooks became parties within three years after they learned 
of the Statefs actions. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court incorrectly applied a statute of limitations 
which has no application to this equitable proceeding. Actions 
such as this one are not covered by sovereign immunity and the 
statute of limitations contained in the Act by which the State 
waived part of its immunity specifically applies only to actions at 
law. It has no bearing on cases such as this one where the State 
has never been immune from suit. 
The Plaintiffs-Appellants pursued their claims against the 
State with reasonable diligence after they became aware of them and, 
under the circumstances, the defense of laches does not apply. The 
decision of the Trial Court should be reversed and the matter 
should be remanded for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
315 East Second South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellant 
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